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Securing the State - Part III
Counter-Terrorism and Community Policing

Andrew Staniforth

Non-Resident Fellow in Counter-Terrorism and National Security

TRENDS Research & Advisory

Foreword

I am delighted to provide the Foreword for the third and final part of this important series contributing to the examination of State responses to counter contemporary international terrorism. In my former national security roles advising the British government I came to learn the stark reality that it will never be possible to stop every terrorist attack. I also understood that to tackle effectively today's increasingly complex terrorist threat, responses to prevent violent extremism and to pursue terrorists must be proportionate, inclusive and subject to strong oversight.

As clearly illustrated in this paper, an effective response to counter-terrorism must be built on an approach that aims to unite the public and police, private sectors, communities, citizens and overseas partners around the single purpose to leave no safe space for terrorists to operate.

The author has compiled the very latest thinking on police and community approaches to counter-terrorism and violent extremism. This approach has resulted in the publication of research which provides a rich blend of theory and operational practice, complementing the vision and mission of TRENDS Research & Advisory, a leading global think tank, based in the UAE, offering unique insights to some of the most pressing security concerns being tackled by governments across the world.

This final paper in the Securing the State series will not only serve to improve the design of counter-terrorism responses at the most local level, but will also serve to directly inform the decision-making processes of those in authority who are charged with the responsibility of keeping their communities safe from violent extremism in all of its forms.

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Acknowledgements

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1. Introduction

Communities the world over, despite their varying social, cultural, geographic and ethnic differences, have common and shared values in their need for safety, security and wellbeing. We live in an age of increasing technical connectivity but many citizens and their communities are disconnected from the police who serve to keep them safe.[1] It is this disconnection which currently raises acute concerns for national security policy-makers and senior police professionals who, in the context of tackling terrorism and preventing violent extremism, believe it is a space which becomes exploited by terrorists who espouse their extremist rhetoric to encourage division, while serving to radicalise and recruit those vulnerable in society to their violent and extremist causes.

In recognising this challenge and identifying the need to bridge the gap between the public and the police to tackle terrorism, there has over recent years been a fresh focus upon the role of Community Policing (CP) in preventing violent extremism at the most local level. This approach has signalled a re-dedication to the founding principles of policing established in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel of the London Metropolitan Police Force. Sir Robert Peel declared the key to preventing crime was not only earning the support of the public, but that every community member must share the responsibility of preventing crime while maintaining at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that "the police are the public and that the public are the police".[2] Widely acknowledged as the "Father of Modern Policing", the core ideas and principles created by Sir Robert Peel and his commissioners remain as crucial and urgent today as they were two centuries ago.[3]

Police officers and homeland security policy-makers at all levels must now understand the full extent to which CP can contribute towards local, regional, national and international counter-terrorism efforts because the contemporary phase of counter-terrorism has evolved important new trends, alongside palpable moves towards expansion and localism in which the amplification of CP to tackle higher national security terrorist threats has been an unprecedented development. This final paper of the Securing the State series will therefore examine and explore new models of CP to prevent terrorism, highlighting ways in which a fresh approach to CP, with police officers and partner agencies who are both informed of the terrorist threats in their locality and who conduct their collaborative duties through the lens of counter-terrorism, can directly prevent terrorism and protect the communities they serve.

2. Catalyst for Change

Although terrorism has been endemic to human history for centuries, there was something particularly horrific about the suddenness and sheer magnitude of the events that took place in the United States on 11 September 2001. In lower Manhattan, on a field in Pennsylvania, and along the banks of the Potomac, the United States suffered its largest loss of life from an enemy attack on its own soil.[4] Within just 102 minutes, four commercial jets would be simultaneously hijacked and used as weapons of mass destruction to kill ordinary citizens as part of a coordinated terrorist attack that would shape the first decades of a new century.

It would be a grave error to regard 9/11 as merely another episode in the long history of terrorism. The nature of the tactics used, and the devastation caused during the attacks, literally and metaphorically marked the dawning of a new era. The global security and intelligence community, stunned by the attacks themselves, had to come to terms with the emerging fact that they had been wrong-footed by a small band of terrorists dispatched by Al Qaeda.[5] During November 2002 the United States Congress and President Bush established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Known as the 9/11 Commission, this independent, bipartisan panel was directed to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the 11 September attacks. Its aim was to identify lessons learned and provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism. In a series of damning conclusions of the 9/11 Commission revealed that domestic agencies – including local police – were not mobilised in response to the terrorist threat, nor did they have appropriate direction or a plan to institute.[6] The 9/11 Commission also went on to conclude that domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies were not targeted against a domestic threat and that both State and local police were not marshalled to augment the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) efforts.[7]

Following the local policing lessons from 9/11 being identified, many nations across the world took steps to improve their counter-terrorism measures. In Europe, the individual Member States of the European Union (EU) responded to the news that elements of the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist cell had operational connections and associates in Germany by developing engagement strategies to improve links between police and local communities.[8] On the morning of Thursday, 11 March 2004, Al Qaeda terrorist cell members placed thirteen rucksack Improvised Explosive Devices (IED›s) containing 10kg of explosives packed with nails on four separate commuter trains in Madrid.[9] Within three minutes all the devices were detonated on busy carriages during the rush hour at El Pozo Station, Calle Tellez, Atocha Station and Santa Eugenia Station. The co-ordinated explosions claimed 191 lives leaving more than 1,584 people injured.[10] The co-ordinated bombings became known as '3/11', being committed exactly 911 days after the 9/11terrorist attacks in the United States.[11] 3/11 allowed Al Qaeda to mark the anniversary of 9/11.

"Despite efforts to strengthen their approach …, security forces across Europe were unable to prevent further large-scale terrorist atrocities."

Responding to the terrorist murders in Madrid the Spanish government made swift changes to its security and defence strategies. Spain had already endured many years of anti-terrorist activity but at the time of the bombings, authorities had insufficient protective or preventative measures in place to deal with the scale and complexity of contemporary international terrorism. The newly heightened sensitivity among the population that terrorists were operating in their communities created an environment for the Spanish government to act, leading them to quickly introduce a suite of new counter-terrorism measures, one of which was the proposal to fund a Centre for National Intelligence (CNI) at a cost of €900 million in the legislative period 2004-2008.[12] The pressing need for this sudden amplification of security assets was recognised by Spanish national security experts who warned of the need to urgently establish effective information networks linking information gained from police officers working in local neighbourhoods to national security agencies and their partners. The terrorist attacks in Madrid remain Europe's worst terrorist incident this century.

In the immediate aftermath of 3/11 European Member States' security forces were on full alert. The interconnected intelligence communities across Europe focused their radars on potential violent jihadist terrorist cells operating within their borders in the hope to disrupt and detect further terrorist plots. Although counter-terrorism efforts had been intensified they could not stop London being attacked by a home-grown, Al Qaeda inspired terrorist cell on 7 July 2005. To provide clarity to the confusion of unfolding events during the London rush hour that morning, the Metropolitan Police Service declared a major incident as soon as it became clear that the set of reported explosions were part of a series of coordinated terrorist attacks.[13] Four suicide bombers killed 52 people travelling on public transport.[14] The bombers› journey began at 04:00 am on 7 July as three of the group left Leeds, West Yorkshire, in a rented car bound for Luton, Bedfordshire. There they met their fourth accomplice, before heading to London by train.[15] The terrorist cell went on to detonate four devices – three on the Underground and one on a double-decker bus.

The 7/7 attacks in London from home-grown British suicide bombers brought a sobering picture of the amount of potential terrorist activity being conducted without the knowledge of the UK intelligence and security agencies. It served to reinforce earlier concerns over a large number of extremist groups and re-emphasised that the state of knowledge within intelligence agencies about their activities was 'not substantial enough.'[16] 7/7 tested the capacity and capability of UK security resources to respond to the emerging challenges it encountered. In particular, the police counter-terrorism departments were stretched to near breaking point.[17] The police service asked whether its current structure and wide-ranging responsibilities were fit for purpose, considering whether there was an alternative way to police and protect this new world. The then Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair stated:

> "Every community is at risk. The police will need authority, tactics and equipment to deal with attacks similar to those of 7 July and far, far worse. Most important of all however, is we will need to draw that authority from a public that understands us and the dilemmas we face. In effect the police face a widening mission. Properly to respond to all of that mission, to move to neighbourhood policing while responding to terror without losing current mainstream services, the police will have to alter the way we work, change the make-up of our workforce and seek out new partnerships with the public, together with new methods

of democratic accountability. What we should seek to avoid at all costs is a separation of local neighbourhood policing from either serious criminal investigations or counter-terrorism investigations. Every lesson of every police enquiry is that, not only the issues that give rise to anti-social behaviour but also those which give rise to criminal activity and to terrorism begin at the most local level."[18]

The 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks amplified the discord between the geographically anchored specialist policing assets and the amorphous threat from distributed non-hierarchical cells affiliated to Al Qaeda. Taken together.During the aftermath of these tragic events, reflection and analysis of government responses found similarities in failings to prevent the attacks at the most local level. The immediacy and the diversity of the terrorist threat brought about a series of fresh challenges. At the core of many of the changes required to tackle contemporary international terrorism was the problematic shift to the pre-emption or interception of terrorism. This was a shift necessitated both by the suicidal component of terrorist tactics and decreasing attack planning timeframes; a shift that had far-reaching implications for national security, and in particular for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). The policing of political violence – traditionally categorised as intelligence-led and politically sensitive – had historically generated structures which had been remote, secretive and specialist. Yet the contemporary evolution of terrorism demonstrated in the 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 attacks, has spawned important new trends and demanded a new policing response. The discovery of terrorist cells, who had evolved to become embedded citizens living in communities, challenged the traditional pursuit of terrorists to ensure that counter-terrorism practices were able to draw upon the information and goodwill of communities from which aberrant extremists were being recruited and radicalised. National security policy-makers had come to understand that international terrorism was increasingly local, therefore, to keep citizens safe, a major shift towards harnessing the capacity of the public to support the broader counter-terrorism effort would be an important development in counter-terrorism practice.

> *"These major terrorist incidents at the dawn of a new century proved a catalyst for change in responding to international terrorism – locally and globally"*

3. Community Policing

The lessons from international terrorist attacks today continue to indicate that national security increasingly depends upon neighbourhood security and local information from communities to help authorities to prevent terrorism and pursue terrorists has come to the fore. While the concept of CP has been embedded in police practice across the world for some considerable time, many police officers and homeland security policy-makers do not fully understand nor appreciate the scale and scope of how it can serve to significantly increase safety at a national and international level. It is now essential that all in authority understand more about the philosophy, delivery mechanisms and key characteristics of CP if they are to fully support and contribute towards the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism. At its simplest level, police interaction with the public through CP reassures communities about the risk from terrorism and reminds the public to remain vigilant. But the individual and collective efforts of a professional and positive CP team and their partners, who

are both informed of terrorist threats in their locality and conduct their duties through the lens of counter-terrorism, can directly prevent terrorism and protect the communities they serve.

The rise of CP over recent decades as a model to deliver policing can be explained in terms of the wider crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness facing LEAs in many nations across the world. There are three interrelated points to be made here. Firstly, ever rising crime rates and the 'nothing works' critique of rehabilitation, raised serious questions about whether the modern criminal justice systems being dominated by police, courts and prisons, was sufficiently effective in controlling crime and disorder.[19] The efficacy of reactive, legalistic criminal justice was, in general, being called into question. Secondly, in the same period, social scientific studies of policing were also directly calling into question the effectiveness of much valued police strategies, from visible patrol to fast response times.[20] A particular concern was the attempts to 'professionalise' policing through an emphasis on fast, responsive, 'fire brigade' models of policing which had not only proved to be of limited effectiveness in terms of crime control, but also of having the effect of drawing officers further away from the communities they served. The gap between the police and the public widened as this model of policing drew officers from walking the beat into marked patrol vehicles where their community contact would be limited to the crisis points to which they were responding. CP thus gathered status as a potentially more effective model of policing that also involved police officers more directly with members of their community – both of which were argued to be ways of improving police legitimacy and public relations.

A further explanation of the rise in popularity of CP relates to how wider changes in the nature of 'community' itself make such an approach to policing necessary. Communities have never been homogeneous and the police have long had very different relations with different constituencies in the community they serve and protect. It is nonetheless argued that the police in many jurisdictions were successful in establishing particularly high levels of legitimacy with the public, in part, because of broadly held consensus about the value of the police amongst the public. However, modern communities have become much more individualistic and fragmented along numerous lines – socio-economic, race and ethnicity, sexuality, political and ethical values and interests etc. This makes it much more challenging for the police to generate broad public support. More diverse communities create more complex, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory public expectations for the police to deal with. CP is one means of engaging with more diverse communities in order to secure legitimacy amongst them.

To move to a CP approach, the police service in England ran pilots of CP in sixteen wards, across eight individual police forces during 2003. Each site contained between 7,000 and 20,000 residents.[21]The purpose of the pilot programmes was to trigger three delivery mechanisms: high visibility of police foot patrols; community involvement in identifying local priorities; and collaborative problem-solving with partners and the public to tackle those priorities.[22] An evaluation of the pilots showed that after 12 months of implementation,as well as improved public perceptions of

"CP had delivered increased public confidence in the police, reductions in crime victimisation and perceptions of crime and anti-social behaviour"

community engagement, police visibility, and familiarity with the police.[23] Importantly, the three delivery mechanisms – high visibility foot patrol, community engagement, and problem-solving – were all found to be critical in improving the public's confidence in the police. More than a decade since its creation and integration, CP remains the preferred policing model in the UK.

4. Community Policing Principles

The concept of CP has proved to be popular and widely used across the world, characterised as the 'new orthodoxy' and 'preferred policing style' amongst senior police officials and leaders all around the world.[24] But for all of its positive outcomes for the police and the public, CP has long been recognised as an ambiguous term and one that has become used in such general ways (referring to almost anything that could feasibly have a bearing on police-public relations) as to be largely meaningless. Recognising this vulnerability, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) articulated 'Ten Principles of Community Policing' during 2006 to clearly state what CP entailed, as well as to achieve national consistency in professionalising the businesses of CP.[25] These principles, which continue to provide a framework for CP policy, practice and procedure today in the UK include:

- **Principle 1** – CP is an organisational strategy that allows the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve problems of crime and disorder and improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings and security.

- **Principle 2** – CP is a mainstream policing activity and integrated with other policing services.

- **Principle 3** – CP requires evidence-based deployment of CP Teams against identified needs.

- **Principle 4** – CP establishes dedicated, identifiable, accessible, knowledgeable and responsive CP Teams which provide all citizens with a named point of access.

- **Principle 5** – CP reflects local conditions and is flexible, responsive and adaptable.

- **Principle 6** – CP allows the police service to work directly with the local community to identify the problems that are most important to them, thereby giving people direct influence over local policing priorities.

- **Principle 7** – CP establishes a regime for engaging other agencies and the public in problem-solving mechanisms.

- **Principle 8** – CP uses an intelligence model as the basis for intelligence-led deployment.

- **Principle 9** – CP requires effective engagement, communication and feedback strategies, and a clear explanation of where accountability lies.

- **Principle 10** – CP should be subject to rigorous performance management, including clear performance monitoring against a local plan and commitments made to neighbourhoods.[26]

The creation of the ten principles for CP served to provide the police service in the UK with a framework within which to establish and deliver CP. Defining the principles by which a neighbourhood is policed means that inspection and assessment of any CP activity can be made against a national standard within general parameters set by the principles. It also provides a base upon which good practice in local policing can be identified and shared nationally to all other LEAs, ensuring that communities across the country can directly benefit from the experiences and lessons learned from each other. CP has become an organisational strategy which allows the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve problems of crime and disorder, and to improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings and security. CP is not a set of specific projects; rather, it involves changing decision-making processes and creating new cultures within police departments. It is an organisational strategy that leaves setting priorities and the means of achieving them largely to residents and the police who serve in their neighbourhoods. In this regard, CP should be viewed as a process rather than a product. The key elements of a CP as an organisational strategy are 'police, partners and the public'.[27] To be effective CP must be based on partnerships, engaging with communities to identify what local problems are, and then seeking ways in which the problem can be tackled and resolved. The police service do not have the monopoly on good ideas when it comes to solving problems in communities, and solutions to crime, disorder, terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism do not come exclusively from the police but also come from partner agencies or within communities themselves.

5. Community Engagement

As a concept 'community engagement' is wide-ranging which involves a regular presence within the community, being part of the community either at an individual or at a group level, and including local citizens in decisions that affect them and the areas in which they live. Engagement is a two-way process and the police must listen to the concerns of the community. The police service knows all too well that it is very often the people in communities who really need support are those that are assessed as either 'hard to reach' or 'hard to hear'.[28] Articulate, well-resourced and fully integrated citizens have very few challenges when attempting to engage with the local police about their specific concerns

"A key principle of effective CP is community engagement"

compared with those in the community who are most in need of being heard.[29] These individuals and groups are very often from minority communities who may be disadvantaged, discriminated against, demonised, or otherwise uninvolved and detached from society.[30] While these are merely indicative examples, every police force area will include individual citizens or groups who do not normally engage in open dialogue with the police.For the effective delivery of policing terrorism and violent extremism, every effort must be made by local policing to reach out and engage with individuals, groups and communities who can support and inform local counter-terrorism measures and interventions. CP must have effective engagement, communication and feedback strategies, with clear explanations of where accountability lies.[31] Effective engagement, communication and feedback all serve to reinforce a community's sense of security and safety.[32] This is a vital element in preventing terrorism and violent extremism at a local level, serving to build resilient communities

who reject extremist rhetoric and recover quickly from terrorist events. An increased sense of public safety and security help minimise the fear, vulnerability and insecurity which terrorists seek to instil in citizens and society.

As an integral part of the CP approach, police and partners have a responsibility to engage with communities, their concerns, and their identified priorities.[33] To effectively engage with the community requires a citizen focused approach which bridges the gap between what the public wants and what the police can deliver. The shift towards citizen focused policing is not just an internal police management issue, nor is it merely a public relations issue; it is fundamentally about organizational culture which underpins the ethos of CP. The police need to involve the community in decision-making to increase their accountability and legitimacy. The contemporary citizen is no longer a passive observer of policing but has become a 'consumer' and 'customer' of the policing product and therefore will not simply tolerate being ignored, or left on the side-lines.[34] Citizen focused policing means reflecting the needs and expectations of individuals and local communities. The objectives of citizen focused policing are to improve public confidence, to increase the satisfaction of police service users and to increase public involvement in policing. Citizen focused policing is not a new area of business or a stand-alone project. It must be embedded through everything the police do and the way it is done, including the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism through a CP approach.

One of the most important concepts within CP for the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism at a local community level is ensuring CP is not divorced nor separated from other policing or public sector activity. CP must exist in symbiosis with community engagement and citizen focus to effectively deliver counter-terrorism policing. To reinforce the message of safety and security the police and partners have to engage in marketing, public relations and communicating messages with considerable expertise, sensitivity and sophistication.[35] For the effective delivery of policing terrorism and violent extremism, every effort must be made to reach out and engage with individuals, groups and communities who can support and inform local counter-terrorism preventative measures and interventions. Community engagement strategies concerning terrorism and violent extremism must be embedded into the very culture of day-to-day CP.

It is also the optimal way for gaining valuable community intelligence which serves to inform the policing response to terrorism at all levels. At its simplest, regular police interaction with the public through CP reassures communities about the risk from terrorism and reminds the public to remain vigilant. Through positive, open and informative dialogue with the public, an effective CP approach can encourage

"Engagement with all communities at a local level remains the key to building capacity to challenge and resist violent extremism which leads to terrorism"

and support people to come forward with information to help keep their own neighbourhood safe. They can also relay messages to reassure their communities in the wake of police operations, terrorist events and concerns in the community.

An excellent example of where a CP approach with effective community engagement to reduce the risk and harm from terrorism at a local level was provided by Thames Valley Police in the UK. Overnight on 9 August 2006, large numbers of police officers were deployed across major cities in England as part of an operation to disrupt a major terrorist plot. A total of twenty-four terrorist suspects were arrested and questioned in relation to the commission, instigation and preparation of an alleged trans-Atlantic terrorist attack of 9/11 proportions. The police and Security Service (MI5) had been monitoring the activities of British-based Al Qaeda inspired terrorists for several years and the executive action taken overnight was the result of the largest joint operation ever conducted by the Metropolitan Police Service and MI5.[36] A potentially catastrophic terrorist attack had been disrupted and intelligence and evidence had been painstakingly gathered under Operation Overt.[37] The communities in High Wycombe, near London, which had been the centre of substantial police and media activity during Operation Overt, were both shocked and dismayed that suspected Al Qaeda terrorists had been living amongst them. The then Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, Sara Thornton, explained that:

> "Operation Overt was a significant success for the police and security services in disrupting a plot to commit mass murder and preventing any lives being lost. The handling of the investigation and media interest was achieved to an extremely high professional standard and rather than dividing the police from local communities, opportunities have been taken to improve relationships and build new lines of communication. The many positive outcomes that have been achieved are due in no small part to the mature and reasonable response of the community living in High Wycombe".[38]

The success of the post-incident management of Operation Overt within the communities of High Wycombe was only possible because of an existing CP approach in that locality which had, over a number of years, created multiple lines and layers of effective community engagement. During heightened concerns from the public, local police officers, though a CP approach, simply amplified their pre-existing efforts to reassure the community. A critical success factor was the presence of community meetings organised by the police and attended by members of the local community, partners and key stakeholders. These meetings had already achieved the joining of partners with the public in attempts to solve the community's problems which were known as Partners and Communities Together (PACT) meetings. The great value of regular public PACT meetings was that they had introduced partners to members of the community and vice versa, which brought alive the notion of mutual support across communities within a neighbourhood to resolve problems.[39] A very important lesson to be learned from the post-incident management of Operation Overt at a local level was that the first occasion upon which communities engage with local police officers about tackling terrorism and violent extremism must not be in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist event or counter-terrorism police operation being conducted in their locality. The pre-existing networks, interactions and partnerships between the police and the public in High Wycombe ensured that community cohesion was unaffected by the arrests of several suspected terrorists from their community. Thames Valley Police had come to understand that a CP approach was mainstream policing activity and in order for it be successful it must be fully integrated with other policing services, especially counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism policing, whether the prevention of violent extremism or the pursuit of terrorist suspects, must be integrated into CP from the very outset, and it is an activity which requires a permanent presence and continued maintenance.

7. Unintended Consequences

In today's increasingly complex, diverse and multi-cultural communities, no one single approach to delivering public safety and security through policing can prove successful for everyone all of the time.   While CP continues to develop, providing positive outcomes for the public and the police, it has, quite naturally, resulted in a series of unintended consequences that those in authority seeking to either adopt or adapt CP must be aware. The supposition that freeing up officers' time to allow them to patrol and engage with communities will somehow automatically translate into more 'on the ground' community-level problem solving seems to be optimistic, without explicit co-ordination of police officers time around CP methods and a detailed understanding of what these methods can deliver.[40]

All in authority would be wise to recognise that the apparent popularity of higher visibility of police officers that CP offers may sometimes serve to stigmatise an area as being a high-threat neighbourhood, and therefore dangerous or otherwise unappealing. The longer-term potential risks to CP are that it can become a vehicle for the practical implementation of local punitive attitudes against marginalised or minority groups, including those communities from which vulnerable individuals are radicalised and recruited to join the ranks of terrorist and violent extremist groups.

It is also important to identify that CP can become problematic if it moves away from a genuine problem-solving ethos towards pseudo-problem-solving through simply appeasing public appetites for enforcement that may function as unduly exclusionary. Appeasing public appetites for enforcement is of acute concern in the aftermath of terrorist events where political stakes are high and where policy-makers and legislators, in fear of being seen as lenient or indifferent, grant the executive broader authorities without thorough debate. In this context, new special provisions and actions are approved without the appropriate consultation or consideration most importantly, from which the next terrorist cell may emerge. Although government may frame their new provisions in terms of a choice between security and liberty, sometimes the loss of liberty is not necessarily balanced by

" The dilemma for law enforcement practitioners, and especially those engaged in CP, is to deliver these new actions without isolating those communities they wish to engage "

the gain in safety and the measures introduced become counter-productive. Embedded in recent years we see the long-term damage upon relations with communities due to the overextended and inappropriate use of specialist anti-terror powers and authority which has damaged community relations and undone the excellent community engagement work undertaken by CP officers.

A prominent example of counter-productive measures to prevent terrorism at a local community level is provided by Project Champion in the UK. During 2010, at the height of severe terrorist threats, residents of several neighbourhoods in the city of Birmingham noticed a large number of metal posts being erected on the pavements of their streets. When cameras were later attached local residents started to ask questions. It materialised that they were part of a scheme devised by West Midlands Police over two years earlier involving the installation of one hundred sixty nine Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras, 49 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras and seventy-

two «covert» cameras.[41] Following complaints from members of the public and pressure groups questioning the use and legality of the cameras it later emerged that Project Champion had been funded entirely by the Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM) division of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). This was news to the local councillors in Birmingham who had been told that the primary purpose was the reduction of general crime and disorder.[42]

In direct response to the concerns of the community, West Midlands Police announced that all of the seventy-two covert cameras would be removed, and full consultation would take place on the overt cameras. While members of the local community welcomed the news, they did not believe that retrospective consultation on a discriminatory scheme went far enough and legal proceedings were considered. The sheer number and location of the cameras, many in residential streets, made it impossible for residents to drive into or out of their own communities without being tracked by the authorities and accusations of 'spying' on local communities were made. Due to mounting pressure, public embarrassment and the loss of trust in policing from the community, West Midlands Police pulled the plug on Project Champion. Mr Mahmood, the Member of Parliament for the local area in Birmingham said:

> "This whole scheme has been a complete and utter disaster. I am appalled about the way it has been handled. This scheme should have been consulted upon properly in the first place and I do hope any form of extremist activity does not slip under the radar as a result of the loss of these resources."[43]

Speaking on behalf of West Midlands Police and the West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit, Assistant Chief Constable Marcus Beale stated:

> "We accept that mistakes were made throughout the project and again apologise to local communities. It has been well documented that there are significant lessons for West Midlands Police to learn, which we have accepted, and we will continue to incorporate these into our future business."[44]

But inevitably there will continue to be times when counter-terrorism police intelligence-based activity, targeted at specific terrorist suspects within communities, will rub up uncomfortably against CP initiatives to engage with the community more broadly. This is likely to be a recurring theme in counter-terrorist work for the foreseeable future. The police service and its partners need to continue to invest effort in explaining their actions to ensure that that they retain public confidence and work with communities. That being said, to be tough on terrorism and the causes of terrorism is a major challenge for policing but it cannot and must not be allowed to deflect the police service and its partners from continuing the intelligence work which is necessary and proportionate to keep citizens and their communities safe, and feeling safe, from the threat

"For the police service, community trust in their actions and abilities is an important part of successfully implementing initiatives to prevent terrorism and violent extremism"

of terrorism and violent extremism. Recognising the potential of unintended consequences for the police, their partners or the public, provides a way in which to positively and pro-actively manage and mitigate risks that may serve to harm the successful delivery of CP. All of these identified consequences are unintended and are insurmountable, provided that regular reviews of CP practices are conducted, and any issues raised are actioned and addressed accordingly.

8. A Way Forward

Whatever the answers to the indiscriminate and unpredictable nature of contemporary international terrorism, the major terrorist events of 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 introduced a new form of relationship between national security and neighbourhood safety, a relationship that would evoke a new type of community-centred counter-terrorism response, fuelling a new era of police collaboration that continues to this day. Concepts such as community involvement, multi-agency working and public assurance, now widely accepted and practised in local policing across the world, have migrated into the policing of political, religious, and ideological violence. All police officers and not just those specialist counter-terrorism officers must now share in the task of countering terrorism which has become a matter for all in the police, for all their strategic partners and for all the public.

The prevention of terrorism and violent extremism cannot be tackled by the police or intelligence agencies alone. Collaboration in counter-terrorism at a local level with partners, key stakeholders and the public is integral to ensure all communities are safe from those individuals and groups who seek to propagate violent extremism designed to damage and divide neighbourhoods. To ensure that the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism are being tackled at a local community level through a CP approach, elements of counter terrorist activity must form part of CP organisational strategies. With advice, guidance and support from specialist counter-terrorism police units, every CP organisational strategy must contain ways in which to tackle and respond to terrorist activity, terrorist events or incidents and include measures to counter the prevention, emergence and propagation of extremist perspectives and behaviours. These local plans must show direct links to the wider operational strategies of each police force and their associated plans for the delivery of policing which in turn, must address their commitment and determination to fully contribute to serving the national and international counter-terrorism interest. Ensuring that such plans address the prevention of terrorism at a local level provides a robust 'neighbourhood to nation' approach, strengthening counter-terrorism measures at all levels.

CP can make a significant contribution towards countering terrorism if all CP officers are engaged in its delivery and are better informed about the intelligence assessments in their locality. If CP officers are regularly updated and educated about the terrorist and extremist threats in their neighbourhoods they are better prepared to conduct their everyday duties. The sharing of information and intelligence to personnel engaged in CP is essential as they have the local knowledge and networks to take positive action. All personnel engaged in CP must be appropriately equipped with sufficient information from the higher policing efforts of counter-terrorism and their intelligence agency partners at a national level. The continued training, education and development of front-line CP personnel in counter-terrorism matters is vital for the effective delivery of counter-terrorism policing. A CP approach requires constant review and investment to ensure it maintains its relevance and effectiveness to deliver safer communities from new and emerging terrorist threats. Investing in CP and extending its reach shall yield positive outcomes for the police, partners and the public. An effective CP approach is also critical to the successful delivery of national plans, policies and programmes to prevent the development of radicalisation leading to violent extremism and to terrorism. As a fundamental part of their national counter-terrorism strategies, many governments have programmes of preventative

actions which are intended to be locally led being driven by analysis of the threat in communities. Without effective CP arrangements in place, building partnerships in communities to oversee the delivery of local preventative action plans to respond to the risk of radicalisation, and the work with partners to embed safeguarding activities to counter violent extremism, cannot be successfully achieved.

Senior police officers and homeland security policy makers must now conceptualise CP in terms of collaboration and coordination, whilst facilitating shared ownership, responsibility and building trust and community confidence. While the primary mission of LEAs across the world has not fundamentally changed over the last two centuries, contemporary policing models, technologies and communities themselves have become increasingly complex, eroding the simple founding principles of CP, disconnecting the police from the very communities they protect. All in authority must now recognise that national security depends upon neighbourhood security and through the development of a flexible, adaptable and scalable CP model to meet the diverse needs of communities, is an essential way forward to provide a method for connecting concepts of CP that are customised to the requirements of the constituencies served by the relevant police forces. A new method, model and fresh approach to CP that understands that the sense of belonging to a particular community (whether it be a specific neighbourhood, self-identified social, religious or ethnic group, or even a virtual network), together with objective and subjective security within that community, is a fundamental precondition for the day-to-day functioning of societies and the well-being of individual citizens. New approaches to CP must be developed that firmly believe that such functioning and well-being is improved wherever citizens, civic organisations and private businesses are empowered to work cooperatively with police and other public authorities to identify and resolve issues together that affect their safety and security.[45]

To counter contemporary terrorism effectively, governments are encouraged to seek new ways of working with their citizens, police and local community stakeholders. Embracing such an approach will serve as a catalyst for change within communities, helping them to become an integral part of counter-terrorism solutions in their locality, and thereby sharing in the ownership and delivery of CP. It is only by working with citizens and community stakeholders more closely that police officers arrive at a full understanding of community concerns, leading to targeted counter-terrorism and counter-extremism preventative interventions and solutions. The CP approach allows for identifying and addressing immediate neighbourhood security symptoms in a way that contributes to furthering national security.

ENDNOTES

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TRENDS

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